INTRODUCTION
Many studies have demonstrated the importance of resources, infrastructure, and leadership for social movements, but few have stressed the relationality of movements and countermovements. 2 Here we offer a comprehensive empirical examination of which types of movement and countermovement resources, infrastructure, and leadership mattered for a class-based neighborhood movement: the Los Angeles rent control movement. We conduct a spatial analysis to determine which of these concepts enhanced renter mobilization in various Los Angeles locales. This focus contributes to a better understanding of local, grassroots movements, which have been generally understudied, and how they may be deterred by their opponents.
The context for this study is the 1970s, a time in which rent control movements emerged in several California cities, including Berkeley, Santa Monica, Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, Long Beach, and San Diego (Č apek and Gilderbloom 1992; Dreier 1997) . The movements in some (e.g., Santa Monica and Berkeley) were stronger than those in others. Specifically, we seek to uncover the determinants of the spatial distribution of renter mobilization in Los Angeles, where renters' mobilization was relatively strong. Why did different subsections of the city respond with varying levels of mobilization?
Resource mobilization theory has repeatedly proved to be a valuable tool in identifying a variety of indicators of social activism (see Edwards and McCarthy [2004] for a review). The theory stems from Olson's (1965) classic study in assuming that collective action entails costs, and therefore, social movements must lower the burden associated with mobilization in order to attract participants. Generally speaking, movements with greater availability and access to resources will have an easier time attracting participants and realizing their goals than those lacking resources, ceteris paribus. Other studies emphasize how a movement's infrastructure affects the realization of its goals. Strong social movement infrastructures are characterized by multiple organizations and network ties across space and racial/ethnic and class divisions (Andrews 2001, p. 76) . These sorts of infrastructures are conducive to attaining political concessions as well as movement support. And many have emphasized the importance of movement leadership (Ganz 2000; Hedströ m, Sandell, and Stern 2000; Grannis, Smith, and Stepan-Norris 2008) . Even in local movements, leaders must get their messages out across various neighborhoods. Barring media access, leaders need alternative means to disseminate their messages across geographical space. This constraint requires the strategic use of network ties across divergent communities (Robnett 1996; Hedströ m et al. 2000) . Varied personal life experiences, often obtained through previous movement or organization work, also allow leaders to develop strategies and tactics that appeal to these differing constituents (Ganz 2000) .
Here, we examine the mobilization potential among tenants involved in the Los Angeles rent control movement as a product of varying resource, infrastructure, and leadership characteristics. We advance beyond the existing literature in two fundamental ways. First, we emphasize the relationality of movements by comprehensively and systematically analyzing the factors involved in movement mobilization while simultaneously considering the infrastructure and leadership of the countermovement in terms comparable to those of the movement. Second, we incorporate the role of geographical space in social movement infrastructure through both organizational network ties and geographic advantage of location and proximity.
To address these issues, we employ a historical case study design with a quantitative data set derived from a survey, sociodemographic, and spatial records, as well as archival and activist sources. We use these materials to compare neighborhoods across Los Angeles in order to consider how resources, infrastructure, and leadership available to movements and countermovements in different neighborhoods affected local levels of tenant mobilization. Our empirical demarcation of the life span of the tenants' rights campaign in Los Angeles corresponds closely with the historical record of the movement. 3 Focusing on local subunits, we investigate a case with a relatively constant set of opportunities (political openings and constraints) but great variation in the mix of resources, infrastructure, and leadership characteristics. This allows us to concentrate on which factors mattered for renter mobilization in Los Angeles. Our focus on how local factors affected the citywide renters' movement also enables us to add to a growing literature that counters the tendency to study national-level social movement phenomena (although, refer to Cress and Snow [1996] , Andrews [2001] , and Sampson et al. [2005] for good examples of local-level studies). Some scholars have even claimed that studying primarily national-level movements "distorts" social movement theory. For instance, in Chicago, only 5.6% of protests between 1970 and 2000 targeted the national level, whereas 31.4% were oriented toward the city and 43.0% toward the locality or neighborhood (McAdam et al. 2005, p. 11) . Like Sampson et al.'s study, our analysis aims to provide a more representative portrayal of social movement activism since the 1960s era by examining movement resources, infrastructure, and leadership and countermovement infrastructure and leadership at the local level.
Resources
The resource mobilization theory emphasizes the extent to which resources are implicated in the success and failure of social movement mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977) . In brief, this theory posits that the availability of resources in the form of personnel, physical space, and money makes or breaks a movement. Edwards and McCarthy (2004) standardize and conceptually clarify a variety of resources that are relevant to the renters' movement. They identify cultural, social-organizational, human, moral, and material resources as distinct types that enhance movement success. Yet the inherent overlap between resource qualities makes any classification system problematic.
Several types of resources are relevant to the renters' movement. The first type addresses the concepts of legitimacy (Gamson 1990; Edwards and McCarthy 2004) , sympathetic support through the encouragement of the movement's goals (Johnston 1994; Cress and Snow 1996) , and solidarity (Fantasia 1988; Cress and Snow 1996) . Social movements draw on these sentiments from the nonmobilized population (i.e., the movements accumulate this resource from people uninvolved with the movement). Further, the ecological concentration of aggrieved populations has been documented to give rise to collective support for a movement (Gould 1995; Zhao 1998) .
We expect that the concentration of renters is of heightened import to the renters' movement because the physical proximity of housing units within rental units puts leaders and participants within convenient reach of potential recruits. At the same time, it also possibly provides a larger base of support and a larger recruitment pool. Unfortunately, our measures do not allow us to decipher which of these mechanisms is at work. We expect that the elderly (who are on fixed incomes) have a more complex relationship with mobilization. While concentration of the elderly may increase support for the movement, it is not likely to gain a high number of recruits for movement activities, as discussed below. We have evidence of senior organizations that were directly involved in supporting the renters' movement, and we expect that members of these organizations would also have been more likely to have been exposed to prorenter information and developments. Material resources mainly refer to money (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Cress and Snow 1996; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996; Andrews 2001; Edwards and McCarthy 2004) . This category incorporates various forms of financial capital and property; however, money remains the most common and transferable form. According to resource mobilization theory, we would expect that if a locale has more material resources, it should have more mobilization potential. However, as Khawaja (1994) has argued, when considering the role of resources, we must distinguish between movements of crisis and movements of affluence. The former refer to collective action initiated by "life-disrupting situations" whereas the latter do not involve such impetus. When the source of a movement involves the "frustration of the population resulting from economic contraction or an overall low quality of life in the areas . . . we should expect economic hardship to increase collective protest" (p. 197). Khawaja examined a movement of crisis and found that in fact resource capacity, not deprivation, was a main source of collective action. In the case of tenant mobilization, while those with the grievance claim of financial hardship had the most legitimacy, we expect that those with more resources were better able to foster mobilization.
Yet there is a limit to the idea that renters' greater monetary resources give rise to increased renter mobilization. As rents reach a certain highend threshold, they may be seen as "luxury accommodations." Some tenants chose high-priced accommodations to obtain the higher status that such accommodations offer. Higher status is likely to correspond to identification with landlords as opposed to other renters, especially renters in low-priced units and in financial need. Therefore, participation in renters' movements is not consistent with the identities of renters in high-priced units.
Specialized knowledge and technical activist knowledge provide another important resource. Edwards and McCarthy (2004) refer to these as cultural resources; however, we call them human resources since this terminology showcases it as a movement-oriented parallel to the concept of human capital (Schultz 1961; Becker 1964; Coleman 1988) . Activists acquire this type of knowledge through either direct organizational experiences or professional training, and they may transfer experiences from prior contentious action to future forms of collective action. Researchers have emphasized that "outside leaders" (Ganz 2000; Morris and Staggenborg 2004) bring with them different sets of social networks and modes of operating, including new and effective insights and collective action repertoires that are likely to benefit mobilization. As we demonstrate below in our review of the leadership and staff of the largest LA renter organization, the Coalition for Economic Democracy, the renters' movement borrowed leaders from labor, seniors' and students' movements, and religious activists. Among these, labor union membership constituted the most salient form of cognate movement experience.
Some scholars have discussed how formal cross-movement coalitions develop (McCammon and Campbell 2002; Van Dyke 2003) , and others have focused on "multiorganizational social movement fields" (della Porta and Rucht 1995; Diani 1995) . Here we are interested in whether or not membership in a cognate social movement enhances the chance that an activist would join the renters' movement. Like the effect for leaders discussed above, we expect that the organizational and social movement experiences of rank-and-file members from these other social movements bring similar advantages. Of labor, senior, student, and religious activists, we expect labor and student participants to be most beneficial for renters' mobilization. While members of senior organizations were likely sympathetic to the renters' cause and some may have actively participated, the group as a whole may have been less likely to become mobilized in renter organizations because of a higher incidence of immobility and health issues. We expect congregants from more liberal religious organizations to be more likely to participate but those from more conservative ones to be less likely to sympathize with renters' aims and to become mobilized (Stepan-Norris and Southworth 2007). Overall, tendencies among religious activists would cancel each other out, resulting in no relationship between religious membership and renter mobilization. Active union members, however, oftentimes attend regular union meetings where they learn the rules of civic engagement and discuss a host of relevant issues including shop floor grievances; local, regional, and national economic conditions; and other activities of members. Additionally, the U.S. union movement has been associated with liberal politics in the last half of the 20th century, and we expect that many unions and their locals supported the renters' movement. Concentrations of those with college degrees may enhance renter mobilization for several reasons. First, some scholars consider general education to be a human resource (McAdam 1982; McCammon 2001) whereby educated residents bring a higher level of sophistication and cultural capital to the neighborhood. Second, college graduates had exposure to (and some may have participated in) campus-based social movements. According to Van Dyke (2003, p. 245) , "Students are a highly active population and have played an important role in most major social movements. . . . Students participated in over 33 percent of the protest events reported in the New York Times between 1968 and 1973." So we expect that cultural resources were facilitated where there were higher levels of college graduates and where experience in labor unions was high.
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Infrastructure Movement success and mobilization depend on accessing and building effective infrastructure to facilitate communication and coordinating systems. Here, we understand social movement infrastructure as a conceptual meeting of multiple organizations and network ties among movement sympathizers that cross spatial, racial/ethnic, or class boundaries (Andrews 2001) . Together, these advantages provide avenues for movements to address larger audiences.
Social movement scholars have a long history of research into the role of organizations. Since the naissance of resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977) , many have depicted organizational involvement in social movements not as a commonality but rather as a prerequisite. Exemplary of this view, Kriesi (1996, p. 152) has succinctly described the role of organizations in social movements as the "building blocks" of mobilizing structures. The premise here is that existing allied organizations within a social movement industry provide a convenient structure of collecting activists, some of whom are willing to volunteer their time and energy to other social movement organizations (McAdam 1982; Zald and McCarthy 1987) . And of course, the number of organizations in a given social movement industry affects the amount of activity around that issue. Soule et al. (1999, p. 251) , for example, found that "the number of women's SMOs [social movement organizations] increases both insider and outsider collective action."
For Andrews (2001) , building and maintaining leader and organizational infrastructure is crucial. Leaders and organizations that are embedded in indigenous, informal networks are more effective because they are better able to communicate to a wide range of audiences including social movement actors and their opponents, potential recruits, and state representatives (see also Klandermans 1997) . And leaders with a diversity of skills and experiences are more adept at employing mass-based tactics and negotiating with other groups. Mobilization, then, is most successful when leaders and organizational infrastructures include expansive ties across communities and subgroups. "In sum, strong movement infrastructures have diverse leaders and a complex leadership structure, multiple organizations, informal ties that cross geographic and social boundaries, and a resource base that draws substantially on contributions from their members for both labor and money" (Andrews 2001, p. 76) .
Social network analysis offers one useful way to assess a movement's organizational structure. In particular, previous movement scholars have relied on affiliation, or "two-mode," networks to capture organizational interaction (e.g., Rosenthal et al. 1985; Fernandez and McAdam 1988, 1989; Osa 2003) . Fundamentally, two types of entities compose affiliation networks: social actors and aggregates to which they belong (Wasserman and Faust 1994, chap. 8; Faust 1997, pp. 157-58) . In his seminal work, Breiger (1974) described using these types of networks as "membership network analysis," whereby people's organizational affiliations can produce both (1) an interpersonal network such that the group memberships held in common form relationships between people and (2) an intergroup network such that the individuals held in common form relationships between groups. In this sense, social ties exist not only between individuals but also between groups and other aggregates. Referencing Breiger, Wellman (1983 , p. 1975 notes that "while physical ties may be between individuals, their structural importance is as links between clusters." We follow this tradition of scholarship here by addressing the ties between neighborhoods as formed by mutual organizational presence. Neighborhoods with more ties to other neighborhoods suggest a greater level of organizational expansiveness.
The social movement infrastructure model, as applied to the renters' movement, predicts that a larger number (and diversity) of tenant leaders, a larger number of tenant organizations, tenant organizational expansiveness, and available resources (money and labor) from tenants all contribute to tenant mobilization.
Leadership
Leaders play a critical role in shaping the social movements they lead by influencing their goals, strategies, organizational structures, and interactions with others (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003; Morris and Staggenborg 2004; Stepan-Norris and Lind 2007; Grannis et al. 2008) . Their role and importance for various movement outcomes have been the subject of many empirical investigations (e.g., see Gusfield 1966; Nelson 1971; Barnett 1993) . In their review essay, Morris and Staggenborg (2004, p. 182) emphasize "interactions among participants and networks within movements" as a means to strengthen skills in both leading and organizing. In their quest for access to successful and coordinated strategies and for organizational allies, leaders gain information about "opportunities, organizational forms, and tactics from one another and from other participants." Whether and how they make use of these circumstances have important consequences for movement mobilization. Ganz (2000) notes that sometimes movements with fewer resources fare better than those with more. To explain this, he develops the concept of leaders' "strategic capacity," which results when they have a wider scope of information sources, heuristic facility, and motivation. "Differences in strategic capacity, in turn, were due to differences in leaders' life experience, networks, and repertoires of collective action and the deliberative processes, resource flows, and accountability structures of their organizations" (p. 1005). Greater strategic capacity results from including both inside and outside leaders with strong and weak network ties and diverse repertoires of collective action. Also beneficial are social movement organizations with open deliberation and a diverse set of resource contributors who are held accountable.
Renter activists' strategic capacity should be enhanced where tenant leaders and organizations have more strong and weak ties and also where renter populations overlap with groups experienced in other social movement repertoires (labor union members, college graduates, and the elderly). When leaders engage in "heuristic processes," they imaginatively recontextualize their understandings so as to allow for alternative ways of conceptualizing and arriving at possible solutions. Because different organizations within the renters' movement are composed of different kinds of renters with different ideas about mobilization, the more organizations, the more diverse the heuristic processes.
While Morris and Staggenborg (2004) have brought attention to leaders and network ties, few empirical analyses have investigated how activists' connections matter (see Gould [1991] , Krackhardt [1999] , and Grannis et al. [2008] for exceptions). Gould's innovative analysis demonstrated that the importance of social ties reaches beyond the usual consideration of the number of ties associated with any given individual to the larger structure of networks and their interconnections. These ties together with organizations create infrastructures.
COUNTERMOVEMENTS
To understand the causal mechanisms behind the mobilization of social movements, especially those aimed at changing legislation (McCarthy and Wolfson 1996) , it is necessary to also understand the infrastructure and strategic capacity of its opposition-the countermovement.
6 A countermovement is simply "a movement [simultaneously] mobilized against another social movement" (Lo 1982, p. 118; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996) . By definition, its goals explicitly seek to undermine both the mobilization and the goals of its target movement. We emphasize here the relationality of movements and countermovements: that one cannot understand movement progress (or lack thereof) without also considering the characteristics of countermovements and their effectiveness in thwarting movement mobilization.
Several studies of countermovement mobilization have demonstrated their potential to retard, if not disable, movement progress. Andrews (2001) , for example, found that violent resistance during Freedom Summer negatively affected community action program funding. Griffin, Wallace, and Rubin (1986, p. 147 ) demonstrate how capital successfully mobilized itself against labor unions and conclude that "formal models of collective action must include the 'counter-mobilization' of movement adversaries."
Countermovement mobilization, like movement mobilization, is subject to collective action constraints, including resource scarcity (Mottl 1980) . The availability of countermovement leadership and organizational networks should similarly facilitate countermovement mobilization, yet there is likely a difference in the resource streams of movements and countermovements that are affiliated with different classes. While landlord organizations may benefit from mobilizing more members, the population of potential recruits is considerably smaller than that of the renter population. By the nature of property ownership, each member of a landlord organization has considerably more resources than each member of a renter organization. Some members have considerable resources, and large donations from those members may account for the lion's share of landlord organizational resources. Though unavailable and inaccessible, information on the concentration of rental property ownership would be one way to estimate landlord organizational resource potential. For this study, we do not test the causality behind countermovement mobilization per se but analyze how countermovement leaders and organizational centrality deter renter movement mobilization.
Despite our expectation that leadership and infrastructure similarly affect movements and countermovements, the effects of countermovement mobilization on the movement are "complicated" (Staggenborg 1989, p. 207) . Although the equality of effects would occur if the movement and countermovement had isomorphic mobilizing structures (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996, p. 1649) , other possibilities exist. Specifically, we may observe greater levels of movement mobilization if the countermovement poses a visible threat and alerts the movement to the need to mobilize (Staggenborg 1989) .
To situate our case in its context, we next provide a short description of the issues surrounding the Los Angeles renters' mobilization.
THE LA TENANTS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT
Escalating rents, condo conversions, and poor building conditions in a tight rental market, along with landlords' failure to pass Proposition 13 savings on to renters, 7 served as the primary push factors in the tenant activism of the 1970s (Dreier 1997) . As the average rent rose faster than the rate of inflation, renters were squeezed, and many were left without affordable housing. Many renters perceived the rapidly rising rents to be "rent gouging," which framed the problem as one of greedy landlords rather than the usual cyclical economic culprits. These claims were not unfounded as indicated in figure 8 Given landowners' power vested in property rights, individual renters had limited options. Following a series of significant legislative events, renters began to collectively address their problem by pursuing the introduction of rent controls.
By 1976, the LA tenants' rights movement had clearly developed political goals. Members sought to initiate, strengthen, and extend coverage of policies limiting rental costs and their consequential increases for tenants and to protect tenants from unjust evictions.
For historical-political reasons, the tenants' rights movement in California targeted local governments. California's rent control issue emerged following a California Supreme Court case in June 1976, which ruled the administration of Berkeley's rent control laws unconstitutional because they inflicted a "procedural strait jacket" on landlords. The justices included in their unanimous decision, however, that because the state of California had not prevented rent controls, cities had the right to impose them during nonemergency times-similar to any other form of constitutional economic regulation (Los Angeles Times 1976c, p. I-3). Simply put, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of rent control as a local policy but indicated that the local administrators of the policies should accommodate landlords by preventing "confiscatory" delays when landlords pursue allowable rent increases.
Following this ruling, California Assemblyman Bill Campbell of Hacienda Heights-who received strong support from real estate developers and apartment owners' associations-authored a bill (AB 3788) that would preempt locally introduced rent controls (Los Angeles Times 1976b, p. II-3; 1976d, p. I-20) . Such a bill would have put rent control under state authority and possibly out of reach of renters' mobilization. The bill The California Supreme Court ruling on Berkeley's rent control, coupled with the vetoing of a rent control preemption bill, constituted the beginning of a political opportunity (Tarrow 1998) for tenants' rights.
9 If Governor Brown had passed the rent control preemption bill, tenants' groups would have had to mobilize at the state level to pass rent control. A campaign to challenge state governments would most likely endure greater costs and difficulties than those that challenge local governments, just as a campaign to challenge the federal government would have been more cumbersome than a challenge to a state government.
After September 1976, Los Angeles County tenants-the fixed-income elderly, in particular-began pressuring their local governments to address rent gouging.
10 Prior to the California Supreme Court ruling on Berkeley, the Los Angeles City Council used the popular method of publicly urging landlords to voluntarily keep their rents low, especially for older tenants. Yet this method lacked an enforcement mechanism. Los Angeles Mayor Bradley similarly endorsed an unsuccessful voluntary rollback approach following the post-Proposition 13 rent hikes, again without results. Although landlords achieved substantial tax savings from Proposition 13, collectively they failed to pass these savings on to their renters (City of Los Angeles Ordinance 151,415, CF78-3231).
This energized the debate surrounding Los Angeles's rental housing crisis. Renters mobilized and demonstrated, and landlord organizations became active as the city council turned its attention to the housing situation. Local contention came to a dramatic peak in 1979 when the LA City Council introduced the first Rent Stabilization Ordinance (City of Los Angeles Ordinance 152,120, CF78-3231 Original A), with many amendments quickly following that year and the next. The initial Rent Stabilization Ordinance established the guidelines for allowable rent increases, 11 unit coverage, 12 and the formation and composition of the Rent Adjustment Commission. 13 Although the ordinance did not meet all of the tenants' goals, the initiation of a law protecting tenants from unreasonable rent hikes satisfied most renters. Within a year of this momentous accomplishment, the movement began to recede. So in 1976, LA renters initiated a wave of contention (Tarrow 1998 ) that reached a peak in 1978 and cooled down by 1986. This timeline is consistent with the predictions of movement scholarship, which indicates that following a success, social movements typically change their form and create new goals or disband (Zald and Garner 1987) .
To capture the time frame of the LA tenants' movement's wave of contention, we measure change in the media attention it received. A frequency count of local media mentions of rent control throughout the relevant period yields a reasonable measure of movement activity. Specifically, we counted the number of articles that appeared in each year under the subject of "rent control" in the Los Angeles Times Newspaper Index (Bell and Howell Micro Photo Division 1976-86 (1976) . Additionally, using archival sources, we counted the number of speakers at each LA City Council meeting that addressed rent 11 The ordinance allowed landlords a one-time-only increase of 19% if they had not raised the rent since May 31, 1976, or 13% if they had not raised the rent since May 31, 1977. Otherwise, landlords were allowed to raise the rents by only 7% annually. 12 The ordinance excluded hotels, inns, nonprofit cooperatives, hospitals, covenants, dormitories, government-owned and/or government-managed units, luxury apartments, and new construction. Additionally, this ordinance contained a vacancy decontrol clause that lifted any controls from a unit upon vacancy. 13 The Rent Adjustment Commission consists of seven members appointed by the mayor. Neither renters nor landlords could be appointed as members.
control during this period. We find roughly the same trend. Figure 2 illustrates that these temporal changes gleaned from two different measures provide corresponding beginning and ending dates for this movement.
14 Historically, political legislation significantly marks the beginning and ending points of the LA tenants' rights movement. The ruling of the California Supreme Court on Berkeley's rent control on June 16, 1976 (Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley), and Governor Brown's veto of a state rent control preemption bill (midnight of September 30, 1976) served as stimulants to the rent control wave of contention; the passage of the Rent Stabilization Ordinance in 1979 marked a high point in concessions to tenant demands; and by the end of 1979 the "hot" wave of contention subsided.
As mentioned above, relationality characterized the LA tenants' rights movement: it operated vis-à -vis a very powerful countermovement whose interests rested in large-scale property investments. The landlords' countermovement indisputably possessed far greater material resources than the renters' movement did. As in all class-based movements, tenants were unable to compete financially with the landlords. In this light, we expect that social movement infrastructure and leadership played a crucial role in tenant mobilization.
The renters movement was able to rely on many local organizations and chapters from a variety of causes, including labor unions, economic justice groups, tenant unions, senior citizen groups, and religious organizations, for help. This collaboration between various organizations suggests that a developed infrastructure should matter considerably for this movement. It additionally indicates a set of knowledgeable leaders able to coordinate across diverse constituencies. In this regard, the LA tenants' rights movement resembled environmental movements and other locally based reform movements that draw from diverse constituencies while simultaneously producing powerful countermovements. THE DATA We collect data from four sources: (1) a cross-sectional random-sample telephone survey of Los Angeles County tenants (Heskin 1979) ; (2) archival records of the speakers on rent control at LA City Council meetings The survey data come from a telephone survey conducted in 1979 (Heskin 1979) , a peak time during the LA tenants' rights campaign for rent control. The survey selected 1,598 respondents using a random-digit dialing technique. Respondents consisted of only renters in the County of Los Angeles who answered questions relating to tenant attitudes and activism.
Archival data come from the LA City Council files (Los Angeles City Archives). We perused the relevant files for the years 1976-79 using the 15 These archival files are available, by request, at the Los Angeles City Archives, 555 Ramirez Street, Space 320, Los Angeles, California 90012-6302: CF76-2809; CF77-1250; CF77-1250 S-2; CF78-3231; CF78-3231 Original A; CF78-3231 S-1; CF78-3231 S-29; CF78-3261A; CF80-2660; CF80-2660 S-8; CF80-2660 S-17; CF80-2660 S-22; CF80-2660 S-22A; CF80-2660 S-29; CF80-2660 S-33; CF80-2927; CF81-5552 S-1; CF82-1623; CF82-1623 S-1; CF82-2144; CF83-1242. 16 Because our dependent variable comes from a cross-sectional survey, our analyses refer to static conditions where a longitudinal approach would be preferable to demonstrate causality.
phrase "rent control" to search through an index available on site.
17 During this time, the LA City Council held nine meetings on the topic of rent control. If a person sought to speak at a meeting, the council required that he or she fill out a "speaker card." These cards asked for the respondent's name, address, position on the proposed legislation (for or against), and one or more organizations he or she represented. From both their position on the meeting's issue and their organizational affiliations, we differentiate protenant speakers from prolandlord speakers. 18 We also created a variable on speakers' residences and connections between their organizations that seeks to measure the extent to which the organizations were geographically diffuse (or central to the movement). Our expectation is that diffuse organizations lead to greater neighborhood centrality, and therefore they should be more effective (see below for details).
The demographic data comes from the U.S. Census Bureau (1980b). 19 This data source summarized the 1980 U.S. census findings by each zip code in the state of California. We consider median household income, the total number of renter-occupied units, and the total number of occupied housing units. Together, these data sources allow us to measure both action and context. We use zip codes as a surrogate for locales or neighborhoods for our unit of analysis. This unit allows us to (1) capture mobilization as a 17 For the years 1976-79, we searched two LA City Council file indexes available at the Los Angeles City Archives under the topic of rent control. For years following 1980, the Los Angeles City Archives has the council files indexed online. We performed an online search for the LA City Council files between the years 1980 and 1986 on rent control issues that substantially affect rental costs. The results of these searches produced council files containing information regarding city council meetings pertinent to rent control initiatives. We used the later years to establish the time frame but not to analyze mobilization. 18 We do not consider the action of attending a city council meeting to constitute an act of tenant mobilization. First, this action uses institutional routes to accomplish social change. Scholars have traditionally excluded more institutional routes such as this from the conception of mobilization. Second, the organizations present at these meetings are not necessarily tenant organizations. A few of the organizations with speakers at these meetings include labor unions, the University of California, Los Angeles, student body, West Wilshire Senior Citizens Center, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Although there were some organizations that had the sole purpose of addressing the renters' needs, such as the United Tenants' Action Council or the Hollywood Tenants' Committee, they are not necessarily representative of each protenant organization. 19 We use the 1980 census for several independent variables even though our dependent variable is measured in 1979. The reason is that the 1980 census provides the best estimate of these demographic factors for 1979. The 1970 census figures are nine years from our target date, and the survey data are not comprehensive enough. We were able to test a few of the variables using both census and survey data and found no appreciable difference in the results. collective neighborhood process; (2) assess intracity variation in the levels of resources, infrastructure, leadership, and mobilization; and (3) treat resource availability, movement infrastructure, and leadership as a matter of local access and exposure.
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CES newsletters come from the University of California, Los Angeles, Library and from the CES offices in Los Angeles. Our review of CES newsletters from April 1977 through April 1978 reveals information on the movement's coalitional partners and the role of activist know-how. We use CES newsletters to get a sense of the relevant participants and allies of the movement.
In the newsletters from these seven issues, we found 23 independent mentions of specific unions (and six additional references to labor/unions in general). These include information about union events (e.g., labor rallies and campaigns), union positions on issues of concern to tenants (e.g., against Proposition 13), unions that were affiliated with the CES, and the hiring of staff members with prior union experience. Religious institutions (churches, temples, and religious organizations) were mentioned 17 times and groups working on racial equality four times during this period. References to religious organizations noted conferences and events, religious affiliations of new staff members, one religious club that was affiliated with the CES, and the use of church facilities for renter activities. There were a few mentions of other organizations (e.g., Grey Panthers, Sons of Watts). Of the seven new staff members who were introduced in the newsletter during this time, four had labor union experience, two had experience in racial equality groups, and one mentioned a church affiliation. Together, these mentions indicate a strong alliance with labor unions and religious institutions and significant CES leadership/staff experience in labor unions.
The CES also reported on its localized tenant-organizing activities and listed the organization and activities of associations in various Los Angeles neighborhoods (San Gabriel, Venice/Santa Monica, Echo Park/Silver Lake, Fairfax, Long Beach, San Fernando Valley, North East Los Angeles, South Bay, and Harbor, South Central) and in specific apartment buildings.
A fairly different picture of organizations involved in renters' interests comes from our conventional forum: speakers at the city council meetings. The organizations mentioned by speakers tend to be more tailored to renters' concerns. The appendix (tables A1 and A2) lists all the organizations mentioned by both tenants and landlords as organizations they represented. Twenty neighborhoods had speakers who were affiliated with senior citizen organizations, 10 with the CES (the vast majority of speakers identified some local renter group as the organization they represented), eight with organizations mentioning religious identities, two with unions, and two with race-based organizations.
THE SAMPLE
From these data sources, we select all the zip codes falling under the jurisdiction of the City of Los Angeles Municipality. 22 Although the rent control movement spread throughout Los Angeles County, by restricting the sample to the City of Los Angeles, we control for the local-political climate as well as consistency in records and measurements.
The telephone survey provided 714 respondents from 85 Los Angeles city zip codes, and the census summarized information from 89 zip codes. These two sources yield 82 zip codes with complete information.
MEASUREMENT OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
To measure mobilization, we use the number of tenant activists within each zip code in 1979, given the number of tenant nonactivists within their same zip code (Heskin 1979) . As mentioned above, we use zip code as our unit of analysis in order to preserve measurement at the smallest level possible. We are convinced that the LA tenants' rights movement mobilized at the "neighborhood" level, sometimes apartment by apart- 21 The Palos Verdes Shores Homeowners Association appears in both the protenant and prolandlord lists in the appendix because of the mixed nature of its positions before the city council. 22 To select the appropriate zip codes, we drew from a list of areas within the city limits of Los Angeles available from a 1980 "Questions and Answers" document referencing a Rent Stabilization Ordinance (Ord. LAMC 151.00 et seq., as amended by 154,237). We excluded zip codes falling outside of these limits. We omit from our multivariate models zip codes absent in either the 1980 U.S. Census Zip Code Summary or the telephone survey (Heskin 1979). ment. 23 Out of the total of 714 survey respondents in the City of Los Angeles, 4.6% (33) indicated that they had ever been involved in "tenant activities" such as joining a tenant organization, organizing a tenant union, joining a political or rent control campaign, or demonstrating at a public meeting. Although this proportion may seem small, with 677,855 renteroccupied units (households) in Los Angeles at the time (U.S. Census Bureau 1980a), we estimate that approximately 31,000 apartment units (households) in Los Angeles had at least one resident active in the rent control campaign.
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As an artifact of random-sampling procedures used by the survey, the number of total occupied rental units within each zip code influenced the number of sampled tenants in each zip code and, consequently, the number of active tenants in the zip codes. We find a .49 correlation between the number of active tenants in each zip code and the total number of occupied rental units. This suggests that, as expected, the higher the total occupied rental units in an area, the higher the number of activist tenants. But because only 4.6% of the Los Angeles City tenants were active in this campaign, zip codes with fewer tenants (and, related, fewer survey respondents) have fewer tenant activists who therefore were less likely to be represented in the survey. In other words, as the size of a zip code decreases, its probability of having and sampling active tenants decreases as well. As a result, we find many (64) zip codes without any activists.
To further demonstrate this property of the data, we turn the reader's attention to figure 3. Here, we have selected four units of observation, zip codes 91345, 91356, 90048, and 90016. The first, 91345, is located in Mission Hills and has a relatively small population and a low proportion of renters. Owing to the small tenant population, Heskin's (1979) survey reached only one tenant in this zip code. If, on average, only 4.6% of tenants were involved in the campaign for rent control, observing activism in 91345 is statistically unlikely. The Tarzana zip code, 91356, has a medium-sized population but a below-average proportion of renters. Although five renters participated in the survey, none were engaged in tenant activism. Owing to the number of surveyed renters, our data are more likely to observe tenant activism in 91356 than in 91345; however, the absence of tenant activists among the five surveyed offers no surprise. While the third zip code, 90048, has a smaller total population than 91356, its population of renters exceeds the Tarzana zip code, leading to greater numbers of both survey participants and sampled tenant activists. The fourth zip code, 90016, has a greater general and renter population than the others, leading to more survey respondents and a good chance of sampling a tenant activist. Though a larger renter population tends to increase survey participation rates, which in turn increases the probability of observing tenant activism, the data do not always abide by this tendency. Indeed, despite its smaller survey participation rates, we actually find more tenant activists in zip code 90048 than in 90016. The task that remains is to account for this variation, net of survey participation.
To address this concern, we use a "two-column" logistic regression (see 99-100). The covariate class grouping, zip code, constitutes our units of analysis and reported number of observations. By using maximum-likelihood estimation, this procedure allows us to calculate the odds of mobilization in any zip code, given the confounding influence of the zip code's sample size, often referred to as the binomial index vector or the binomial denominator vector. 25 For each zip code, the dependent variable is the number of mobilized tenants (first column) given the number of their nonmobilized renter neighbors (second column). The regression generates parameter and standardized error estimates identical to traditional logistic regressions and computed by an iteratively reweighted leastsquares algorithm using the generalized linear model command (GLM) in R (R Development Core Team 2009).
MEASUREMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
To account for the variability of tenant mobilization in Los Angeles municipal zip codes, we assess which facets of resource availability, social movement infrastructure, and leadership encouraged or undermined mobilization. This section summarizes how we measure these items.
Control Variable
For our models we include a control for the percentage of renters in the zip code. We divide the total number of occupied rental units by the total number of all occupied units for each zip code and multiply the resulting figure by 100 (U.S. Census Bureau 1980b). While this measurement likely has a positive influence on tenant mobilization, we have no way of deciphering which mechanism generated its effect. For example, a greater proportion of renters could indicate greater levels of sympathetic support for the movement, a concentration of an aggrieved population, or a proportionately larger recruitment pool. Owing to the effect's ambiguity, we exclude it from theoretical discussion.
Resources
We use three measurements of resources. The first of these is the percentage of college graduates within the locale (U.S. Census Bureau 1980b ). This population presumably brings heightened levels of political sophistication and knowledge to neighborhoods. The second measurement is the percentage of tenants who belonged to labor unions (Heskin 1979) . Union membership provides knowledge of local organizing and collective action. Third, we include median household income in our analyses to test whether available income encourages or dissuades tenant activism. We divide the latter figure by 1,000 for ease of interpretation.
Infrastructure
Whereas Khawaja (1994, p. 201 ) used a dummy code for whether the sponsoring organization was present or not during the event, which was "far superior to the commonly used counts of formal national associations and organizational membership because it provides information directly on the actual involvement of organizations in the process of collective action," we provide a higher level of detail. To account for social movement infrastructure, we use five indicators: (1) geographical distance to other parts of Los Angeles, (2) the number of organizations representing tenant interests with active members in the locale, (3) the neighborhood centrality of these organizations, 26 (4) the number of organizations representing landlord interests with active members in the locale, and (5) the neighborhood centrality of these landlord organizations. Below we will discuss our measurement of geographical distance, followed by the number of protenant and prolandlord organizations, and finally protenant and prolandlord neighborhood centrality in the interorganizational network.
Zip codes in a more geographically accessible location should experience heightened mobilization. The tenants living in these zip codes experience greater levels of information exposure. If the LA tenants' rights movement was truly a citywide movement, one in which activists recruited others throughout the city, then those tenants living in a more central location should have had more contact with the movement. This is especially true for a city as geographically dispersed as Los Angeles. Activists throughout the city should be able to reach centrally located tenants more easily than those living on the outskirts. This can be measured using the average distances between locales. For each of the 93 locales (those zip codes in the Los Angeles municipality within either the 1980 U.S. Census Zip Code Summary or the telephone survey [Heskin 1979]) we plot the distance between their centers and all other zip codes in the municipality using Mapquest (http://www.mapquest.com). We take the locale's mean distance from all other locales. Smaller values indicate closer geographical proximity to the city's center.
Representatives of organizations concerned with rent control initiatives also have a presence in many locales. These organizations aligned themselves with either the tenants or the landlords. 27 We are interested in how many of these respective organizations have members in each locale. We provide two measures: (1) the number of protenant movement organizations with one or more city council meeting participants in the locale and (2) the number of prolandlord countermovement organizations with one or more city council meeting participants in the locale. We gathered this information from the speaker cards.
Organizations that were more geographically diffuse were more central to the movement-or the countermovement-than others. Using the speaker cards, we assess the centrality of these organizations by measuring participants' organizational connections to participants in other locales. This task of measurement requires a four-step procedure. The end result yields the number of locales "connected" to any given locale through their residents' mutual membership in protenant and prolandlord organizations. Higher values suggest that the organizations with members in the locale exhibit a more central role in the LA tenants' rights campaign.
Our measures of protenant and prolandlard neighborhood centrality in the interorganizational network produce values equivalent to the quantity of neighborhoods "tied" to any specific neighborhood by way of common member rosters in protenant and prolandlord organizations. In general, this measurement indicates the presence or absence of activists in geographically diffuse organizations. The procedure follows four steps.
First, we create two two-mode sociomatrices, and , to represent In the second step, we then multiply each of these sociomatrices by their respective transpose. This procedure creates two one-mode sociomatrices, and . The submatrix represents the number of tenant Wasserman and Faust [1994, chap. 8] for more details on degree centrality). While other scholars have produced alternative measurements for degree centrality in affiliation networks (Bonacich 1991; Faust 1997, pp. 166-69) , we elect to use the row sum method on dichotomous, one-mode data because it is the most parsimonious centrality measure for the sake of interpretation (Freeman 1979) . These measures indicate the number of zip codes in Los Angeles "connected" to zip code i through protenant (t) organizational membership, in the case of , or the number of zip codes t Z i,j in Los Angeles connected to zip code i through prolandlord (l) organizational membership, in the case of .
Leadership
We measure movement leadership by the absolute number of LA City Council meetings on rent control in which at least one person from the locale spoke on behalf of the tenants. 28 We measure countermovement leadership by the number of city council meetings on rent control in which one or more persons from the locale spoke on behalf of the landlords. These measurements reflect the dedication proponents on each side expended by attending city council meetings. We assume that those who 28 We use the number of meetings attended rather than the number of attendants from the zip code because information portrayed on the speaker cards suggests that residents in neighborhoods, communities, and apartment complexes often nominated only one or two people to represent them at these meetings. attended and, specifically, those who indicated a desire to speak at the city council meetings tended to be the activists/leaders of the movement or countermovement. The more meetings at which a locale's members spoke, the greater its presence of leadership. Table 1 provides the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum value for all our measurements. With regard to tenant activism, we see that, on average, most zip codes do not have any tenant activists despite a mean surveyed sample size of eight tenants. While the maximum value for the percentage of unionized tenants is quite high (100%) for two of the zip codes, the distribution is right skewed, and omitting these cases makes no substantive difference in our regressions. Our measurements for the number of protenant and prolandlord organizations are also right skewed, as we see that on average only one of each is present in each zip code; however, the maximum numbers of organizations in a zip code are nine and five, respectively. Related, we find that neighborhood centrality in the interorganizational networks skews right as well, with standard deviations larger than their distributions' means. Finally, the mean numbers of protenant and prolandlord leaders, 1.280 and 1.333, suggest that leadership is a relatively rare phenomenon, though as many as six or seven city council meetings may be attended by a resident of the zip code.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
As stated earlier and indicated in figure 3 , greater numbers of survey respondents in a locale produce a greater likelihood of observing tenant mobilization. We use two-column logistic regression models to provide a comprehensive look at the relevance of the variables (see tables 2, 3, and 4). These models take sample size into account by weighting the nonmobilized population. This regression predicts the odds that a zip code will have a surveyed tenant who participated in the renters' movement in any of the following ways: (1) belonged to a tenant organization, (2) organized a tenant union, (3) participated in a political or rent control campaign, or (4) demonstrated at a public meeting.
We estimate eight nested models beginning with a control model and then adding material and human resources, infrastructure, and leadership effects. For the models with infrastructure and leadership variables, we provide three models that show the movement effects only, the countermovement effects only, and their combined effects in the same model. This strategy allows us to report the differences between movement and countermovement effects using goodness-of-fit criteria between models and also in terms of statistical significance within the same model. To address the possibility of multicollinearity, in preliminary analyses we ran a model for each variable individually (along with an intercept) to compare its univariate effect to the effect reported in the full model (model 8) in order to see if the variable's unique effect contradicts the evaluation of our hypotheses. While some effects that bordered on the threshold of significance either gained or lost statistical power in this test, none resulted in contradictory findings. In results not shown, we run a regression for each theoretical block individually (nonnested) along with the control. The results are substantively comparable to those shown, though with fewer effects reaching statistical significance in the nonnested models. Using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) from these nonnested models, we determined the order of our nested models from best (material and human resources) to worst (leadership) in terms of improvement in fit over the control model. Our nested modeling strategy demonstrates the contribution each additional factor makes to the overall model fit. We use both the chi-square likelihood ratio test and the AIC to evaluate model fit. Used specifically for nested models, the chi-square likelihood ratio test is two times the difference in log likelihood between the test model and its reference model. The probability of this measurement follows a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference of the two models' respective degrees of freedom. In other words, it evaluates the differences in loglikelihood fit as a probability of additional parameters. While the chisquare likelihood ratio test accounts for the differences in log likelihoods between the reference and test models, the AIC's calculation uses only the test model's log likelihood and its number of parameters. Its equation-negative two times the model's log likelihood plus two times the number of modeled parameters-includes a penalty against effects, whereas smaller AIC values suggest a better, more parsimonious model. While AIC values cannot be generalized across different data sets, they are useful in identifying the best fit among nested models. Model 1 tests our control, percentage of renters in a neighborhood. As we see, this effect has only marginal predictive power, and the log-likelihood ratio test indicates that the effect fails to provide a significant improvement over the null, intercept-only model. However, as a control model, its goodness-of fit-criteria provide a benchmark for the subsequent, substantive models.
We test the role of material and human resources in model 2. In this model we see positive and statistically significant effects for the percentage of college graduates and the percentage of unionized tenants. Each additional one-unit increase in the percentage of college graduates in a zip code increases the odds that a sampled tenant in the zip code will participate in the rent control campaign by 5.7%. In terms of the effect of unionized tenants (percentage), an additional 1% increase of their population among tenants in a zip code yields a 4.4% increase in the odds that a sampled tenant in the zip code will be mobilized. These effects generally remain significant throughout the remaining models with comparable coefficients. 29 Median household income (in thousands of dollars) fails to produce a significant effect on tenant mobilization here or in any of the following models. 30 This model also shows a dramatic improvement in goodness of fit relative to the control model, as indicated by the diminished AIC (from 124.240 to 104.957) and the statistically significant chi-square likelihood ratio test.
Models 3, 4, and 5 add movement and countermovement infrastructure to model 2. Confirming expectations, models 4 and 5 show that zip codes further (on average) from others in Los Angeles are less likely to experience 29 The effect of percentage of college graduates in a zip code drops to P ≤ .10 in models 3 and 6. 30 In models not shown, we have replaced this measurement of income with per capita income and a number of curvilinear transformations. None of these similar measurements produced a significant effect on tenant mobilization. tenant activism. This effect reappears later in models 7 and 8. Also supporting our hypotheses, models 4 and 5 show that the neighborhood organizational centrality of landlords suppresses tenant mobilization. The effect of neighborhood organizational centrality on behalf of tenant organizations does not, however, reach the P ≤ .05 threshold of significance here or in subsequent models. In fact, judging by the magnitude of the coefficients in model 5, the effect of protenant neighborhood centrality in the interorganizational network recedes after accounting for countermovement infrastructure, whereas its prolandlord counterpart's coefficient strengthens when controlling for movement infrastructure. Further, the quantity of organizations present within a zip code-representing either the landlords or the tenants-does not influence tenant activism in the hypothesized directions. While each of these three models shows some improvement in fit relative to the AIC in model 2, the only one to significantly improve the likelihood is model 5. We include movement and countermovement leadership effects in models 6, 7, and 8. When attributed on the behalf of renters, leadership fails to significantly promote tenant activism. Not only is the effect of protenant leadership insignificant in model 6, but the AIC demonstrates that its inclusion worsens the goodness of fit with respect to model 3. Including countermovement effects in model 8 confirms this, as indicated by the insignificant and weakened coefficient for protenant leadership. In contrast, the presence of leadership on behalf of the landlord interests succeeds in dissuading tenant activism within a zip code. Model 7 shows that each city council meeting attended by one or more prolandlord speakers within a zip code reduces the odds that a sampled tenant engages in rent control activism by an astounding 48.8%. Though not as strong, this effect is also significant in model 8. While both models 7 and 8 show an improvement in AIC over their respective reference models (models 4 and 5), only the goodness of fit for model 7 passes the chi-square likelihood ratio test. Judging by the AIC, model 7, which includes material and human resources as well as prolandlord infrastructure and leadership, clearly offers the best explanation for tenant mobilization.
To gauge the accuracy of our analyses, we compare model 7's predicted number of tenant activists to the actual number of tenant activists sampled in each neighborhood. In confirmation of expectations, the observed and theoretical values for tenant activism are significantly correlated, with Spearman's r equaling .666 (P ! .001). To visualize how model 7 performed, we include maps ( fig. 4) for both the observed and predicted distribution of tenant activism. As we can see, the model correctly estimated an absence of mobilization on the outskirts of the city. And while it does demonstrate a clear tendency toward mobilization in the central city, model 7 is off by approximately one activist in 17 of these zip codes 31 It also appears to underestimate the number of tenant activists. Indeed, model 7 estimates 28 tenant activists in the sample (rounding to the nearest tenant in each zip code), whereas these same zip codes in fact had 33 mobilized tenants (accounting for missing zip codes in model 7).
CONCLUSION
To further collective action and social movement theory, this study has tested three widely accepted explanations for mobilization in a novel way. Beyond our application of an innovative network methodology and a comprehensive case study design of a local-level movement, we also make a minor theoretical contribution: we demonstrate the extent to which the relationality of social movements and countermovements must be considered. In cases in which countermovements are mobilized, one cannot fully understand movement dynamics without accounting for their countermovements.
In our case, access to human resources (the organizational experiences of union members and the broad-based knowledge of college graduates) within a locale lowers the costs associated with mobilization, whereas material resources did not affect this. While we acknowledge the limitations of our cross-sectional data, our findings dramatically demonstrate the important influence of countermovement infrastructure and leadership. As hypothesized, both leadership available to the countermovement and neighborhood centrality in the interorganizational countermovement network depress movement mobilization. Studies that do not take these countermovement factors into account are missing a major part of the story. Also important are proximate locations. Cress and Snow (1996) identified a lacuna in the social movement literature regarding the link between the concept of "resources" and its empirical applications. While they made a first pass at this goal by using combinatorial, Boolean logic, their work predates important conceptual developments on various types of resources (Edwards and McCarthy 2004) , infrastructure (Andrews 2001) , and leadership (Ganz 2000; StepanNorris and Zeitlin 2003; Grannis et al. 2008 ). We found a strong role for human resources (the percentage of college graduates and percentage of unionized tenants); however, we find no role for material resources in the Los Angeles renters' movement.
Movement infrastructure matters. First, geographical distance from the site of mobilization made a difference, such that those locales that were closer to the others experienced a higher degree of mobilization. Second, our measures of countermovement infrastructure revealed an important role for organizational networks beyond basic organizational strength as measured by numbers of organizations: when prolandlord organizations had participants across multiple locales, their impact on decreasing mobilization was greater. What makes landlord centrality so effective? We suggest that it is the value of enhanced interorganizational communication and the breadth of available information. When organizational contacts are dispersed across geographical space, access to potential participants is enhanced, and leaders are prompted to imaginatively recontextualize their understandings so as to allow for alternative possible solutions leading to increased mobilization. Griffin et al. (1986, p. 155 ) powerfully demonstrate how capitalist organizations negatively affected labor unions by mobilizing the class's "resources of money, access to the political center, and moral suasion." Similarly, to the extent that landlord organizations bring together wealthy and powerful landlords from locales across the city, they amplify their resources and access to political officeholders and the media. The California Association of Realtors (2002, pp. 4-5) accordingly encourages those who oppose rent control to be proactive, involve themselves with local commissions and task forces, assemble allies, get elected to local offices, and get involved with elected officials. This is not a list of strategies available to the average renter. Landlord organizations with connections across neighborhoods were better able to share successful strategies for repressing emergent renter movements.
While the importance of network connections has been extensively elaborated for individuals in general (e.g., Granovetter 1973 Granovetter , 1983 Gould 1989; Burt 1992; Friedkin 1993 , to name only a handful) and in social movements in particular (e.g., Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Zhao 1998; see Kitts [2000] for an extensive literature review in this area), few studies have identified the importance of social movement organizational networks for movement mobilization. And of those few that have addressed the role of organizational networks on movement mobilization (Fernandez and McAdam 1988, 1989; Gould 1991; Diani 2003; Osa 2003) , none have incorporated similar network measures for the movement's respective countermovement, opposition, or adversary. We have demonstrated here that organizational networks, particularly countermovement organizational networks, constitute an important influence that cannot be ignored.
In its focus on networks, this study also contributes to social movement theory by considering "mesolevel" variables. As Hedströ m et al. (2000, p. 145) argue, these networks "dramatically influence the speed at which a contagion practice will diffuse." Their work found in the case of the Swedish Social Democratic Party that activists "reported on social democratic activities and actions by adversaries in other, more distant districts" (p. 153), and we find that renters' networks produced a similar kind of effect.
Finally, we found that the number of leaders mattered for landlords but not for tenants: the more speakers in favor of landlord interests, the lower the level of tenant mobilization. This finding, along with the results regarding landlord network connections, emphasizes the necessity of including measures of countermovement effects in all investigations of movements when relevant. If we had omitted landlords' use of infrastructure and leadership, our models of social movement mobilization would have been severely underspecified.
As to why tenant mobilization fluctuated by countermovement infrastructure and leadership but not by movement infrastructure and leadership, we offer four case-specific possibilities. First, the landlords had previously established a successful infrastructure that aided the passage of Proposition 13. Many of the same leaders and organizations involved in the Proposition 13 campaign continued later to actively oppose rent control policies (including Howard Jarvis and the Los Angeles Apartment Owners Association). Tenants were not as involved with this historic proposition and lacked such an infrastructure (as stated earlier, they did not oppose the proposition because of the promise that landlords would share the proceeds with them). Second, landlord organizations often followed more of a professional and business-oriented model of civic association rather than that of a traditional social movement organization. This contrasts with the tenants' organizational model, given the absence of a common occupation among them. This movement-countermovement contrast in organizational form more closely resembles conflict between environmentalists and their business targets than cases of pro-life versus pro-choice organizations. Third, the diversity of interests on the protenant side may have introduced a liability. As seen in the appendix, organizations representing tenant interests were both more numerous and varied in interest than the prolandlord organizations. While this characteristic could prove beneficial in reaching a larger base of constituents, it may also present difficulties in coordination since networks with fewer social entities are usually more centralized in nature (Anderson, Butts, and Carley 1999) . Finally, tenants likely faced a disadvantage in establishing a collective identity relative to landlords. By virtue of owning property at a set location, landlords possess lasting ties to their investments, occupation, and neighborhood. Lacking these ties, tenants are relatively free to move between apartments and neighborhoods or become homeowners should their personal finances allow.
These findings have significance for social movement mobilization in general. Because the LA renters' movement operated at the local level, it serves as a representative test of the role of resources, infrastructure, and leadership in social movements more generally .
Nevertheless, like all movements, the tenants' rights movement is unique in some ways. Its unique characteristics remind us that our specific findings on which types of resources, infrastructure, and leadership mattered for mobilization should not be blindly generalized to all social movement mobilization. First, the tenants' rights movement supported only moderate reforms that were especially attractive to elderly tenants on limited incomes. This framing of the issues resulted in low levels of disagreement with the movement's desired goals, as compared to some other social movements. Second, the renters' movement, like a substantial subset of other movements, relied on many local organizations from a variety of other social movement causes. This collaboration between various organizations may have uniquely affected the role of infrastructure for this movement. With regard to these general conditions, the LA tenants' rights movement resembles environmental movements and other locally based reform movements that draw from a diverse constituency. Third, the tenants movement produced a powerful countermovement. And fourth, the tenants movement crystallized along class lines. With powerful landlords opposing them, tenant access to potential participants with higher income did not aid the movement. This rendered organizational experience and knowledge more important. We expect that each of these movement characteristics played a role in determining the extent to which each of the resource types mattered for mobilization.
Studies have shown that individually, different types of resources (e.g., Zhao 1998; McCammon 2001; Conway and Hatchen 2005) , infrastructure (Andrews 2001) , and leadership (Ganz 2000) have affected mobilization, yet none have attempted a comprehensive examination to assess their relative influence on one movement while simultaneously considering the resources of the countermovement. A metanalysis of the existing results would identify some inconsistency in their findings. Although part of the difference is undoubtedly attributed to the political context and idiosyncrasies of each movement studied, these discrepancies are also due to a lack of breadth in the conceptualization and examination of movement resources, infrastructure, and leadership. We encourage future studies to consider the role of both the movement and the countermovement as well as the interacting effects between them.
Our comprehensive findings on the impact of material and human resources, infrastructure, and leadership advance movement scholarship by demonstrating how, where, and in what ways these factors affected a class-based local movement. Education, labor union experience, and geographical access all had a role in increasing tenant mobilization in Los Angeles locales, whereas countermovement leadership and neighborhood centrality in the countermovement organizational network hampered that mobilization. 
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